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Accrual measures of pension-related 
compensation and wealth of state and local government workers 
Abstract 
 
  This paper develops a method to convert the normal costs and actuarial liabilities 
published by state and local government retirement systems for their defined benefit 
pension plans to measures consistent with national income accounting principles.  It also 
standardizes the measures using a common discount rate.  The method is applied to data 
for the years 2000 to 2006 to generate a set of national and state estimates of employer 
normal costs and liabilities which are then used to improve the estimates of compensation 
and property income in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).  Using a 6% 
discount rate, our estimated liability of state and local government retirement systems is 
about 4% lower than the published liability for 2006 and our estimate of normal costs is 
about 48% higher.  Adopting these estimates would add $105 billion (or about 1.0%) to 
personal income in 2006.  Revisions to state estimates of personal income would range 
from a 0.7% reduction in West Virginia to a 2.3% increase in New Jersey.   2
Accrual measures of pension-related 




  Although most parts of the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) 
are kept on an accrual basis, the income and outlay account is kept on a cash basis 
because of data limitations.  An important component of the personal income of workers 
is that portion of their compensation which is saved in defined benefit (DB) pension 
funds.  BEA estimates that state and local government employers contributed 6.7% of 
employee compensation to such pension funds in 2006 on a cash accounting basis.  In 
recent years, a decline in the value of equities, low interest rates, and the continued 
growth in the liabilities of pension funds have raised concerns about the financial 
soundness of DB pension funds.  In response, many pension plan sponsors contributed 
large lump sums to the funds, imparting some unusual volatility to compensation 
measured on a cash basis, and distorting comparisons of current labor costs across 
industries and regions. 
  Because the contributions employers make to pension funds generally do not 
match their workers’ accruals of future pension benefits, neither do the assets held by 
pension funds match the workers’ accrued pension wealth.  This in turn affects estimates 
of the property income (dividends, interest, and rents) of pension funds and constitutes a 
second distortion in the measurement of personal income in the NIPA because the 
property income of pension funds is attributed to persons. 
                                                           
1 I would like to thank Marshall Reinsdorf, and Ann Dunbar for helpful discussions, and Bruce Baker, Sean 
Puckett, Karla Allen, Michelle Grier, Jonas Wilson, Devin McIntosh, Evan Lin, and Darob Malek-Madani 
for data assistance; however, any errors in this paper are my sole responsibility.  An earlier version of this   3
  This paper investigates whether national income accounts can measure the 
household sector’s pension compensation and wealth on an accrual basis using publicly 
available financial and actuarial reports of the pension funds.  In particular, this paper 
looks at the pension funds for employees of state and local governments.
2  These pension 
funds are not only a large proportion of all funds in the U.S.,
3 they continue to be the 
primary type of pension fund for state and local government workers. 
  State and local government retirement systems differ from private pension plans 
in several important dimensions. 
  (1) Employees often contribute a large share of their salaries to state and local 
plans in addition to the amounts employers contribute whereas in the private sector 
employee contributions are rare.
4 
  (2) State and local plans are exempt from most of the regulations (including the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)) that private plans are subject to.  
Some state and local plans (e.g. the Pre-1996 Fund in the Indiana State Teachers’ 
Retirement System) are unfunded and financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.  Pay-as-you-go 
financing is prohibited by ERISA. 
  (3) Some state and local employees do not participate in the federal Old Age, 
Survivors’ and Disability Insurance (financed by a 6.2% tax on covered earnings) and so 
                                                                                                                                                                             
paper was prepared for the 30th General Conference of the International Association for Research in 
Income and Wealth, August 25, 2008, Portoroz, Slovenia. 
2 Some pension plans also provide for retiree health care benefits and until recently did not report 
contributions and benefits for health care separately from cash pension benefits.  In this paper we make 
adjustments as necessary to exclude retiree health care benefits. 
3 Employer contributions to state and local government employee retirement systems were $65.3 billion in 
2006 while employer contributions to private defined benefit pension plans were $93.3.  Federal DB 
contributions separate from defined contribution (DC) contributions are not published.  See NIPA Table 
6.11D. 
4 Of course, all contributions to the pension fund are out of employee compensation, the distinction 
between employee and employer contributions arises in a national accounting framework because   4
their contributions to defined benefit and defined contribution retirement funds are larger 
than for those who do participate.
5 
  (4) Some state and local plans have automatic cost of living adjustments to 
pension benefits.  This is rare in the private sector (Bodie 1990a). 
  (5) In the regulatory filings of private plans, the main measure of liability is based 
on benefits accrued as of the valuation date and ignores projected salary increases.   
Valuations of public plans, on the other hand, usually take into account expected salary 
increases associated with promotions, inflation, and productivity growth. 
  (6) State and local plans, unlike private sector plans, are not insured by the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 
  (7) Accounting standards differ.  Private plans generally follow the standards set 
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) while public plans follow the 
Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB). 
  (8) Data sources differ.  Under ERISA, most private plans are required to report 
detailed accounting and actuarial information on Form 5500.  State and local plans are 
exempt from those reporting requirements but do provide some information in response 
to a Census Bureau survey of government employee retirement systems.
6 
  Because the pension concepts and terminology of accountants and actuaries are 
not familiar to all economists, this paper begins with a presentation of formulae for 
pension benefit accruals and liabilities and then compares them with the normal cost and 
actuarial liability measures of actuaries.  The paper next presents cash estimates of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
employee contributions are deductions from amounts recorded in the NIPA as wages and salaries; 
employer contributions are not and must be separately estimated.   5
defined benefit (DB) pension compensation and wealth for the years 2000-06 and 
compares them to the published actuarial estimates.  Then the paper considers two 
important adjustments needed to convert these published actuarial estimates into 
measures consistent with national income accounting principles using a common discount 
rate.  After making these adjustments a very different picture emerges of household 
income and saving behavior. 
  In addition to improving the National Income and Product Accounts, the proposed 
measures should be useful in other contexts such as evaluating to what extent there is a 
compensating wage differential for state and local government workers corresponding to 
their pension benefit accruals (Ehrenberg 1980) and improving surveys of worker 
compensation. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 “Approximately one-fourth of all employees of state and local government do not participate in Social 
Security, including nearly one-half of all public school teachers and most or substantially all public 
employees in Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Nevada” (Brainard 2006 p.7). 
6 The Census Bureau has recently expanded its survey to collect actuarial data about the retirement systems.   6
I.  The Accrual of Pension Benefits 
  Most of the issues pertinent to this paper can be illustrated with a model of a 
simple pension plan.  In this model, a worker vests immediately upon hire, there are no 
breaks in service, benefits begin at age r , administrative costs are zero, there are no 
special provisions for early retirement, and there are no cost of living adjustments to 
benefits after retirement.  B  is the accrued retirement benefit to be paid each period 
(year).  B  is some function of covered salary 
* W , length of covered service s, and a 
multiplier k .  The accrued retirement benefit as of the worker’s current age ( s h+ , where 
h is the age when he was hired) is given by
7 
(1)  r s h s h ksW s h B < + + = + ), ( ) (
* . 
  The expected present value of future benefits, as of the retirement age r , for an 
employee with  h r −  years of service is 
(2)  da e a r S r B r L
r a i
r
) ( ) , ( ) ( ) (
− − ∞
∫ = . 
where i is a discount rate and  ) , ( a r S  is a survival rate, the probability that a retiree will 
survive from age r  to age a and collect his pension benefit.
8   ) (r L  is a liability of the 
plan to the employee. 
  ) (r B  is given as of age r .  Therefore it can be pulled outside the integral in Eq. 
(2) and the liability written as 
(3)  ) ( ) ( ) ( r A r B r L = , 
                                                           
7 This model is based on Barnow and Ehrenberg (1979). 
8 In this model we consider only mortality risk.  Defined benefit pension plans also typically have 
provisions for disability and survivorship benefits as well as provisions for workers who leave after vesting 
but before they are eligible to begin receiving retirement benefits.  Although we do not model these risks 
we do take account of them in the subsequent empirical work.  See Winklevoss (1993) for a mathematical 
treatment of these risks.   7
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r a i
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where  ) (r A  is an annuity factor, the present value as of the retirement age r , of a 
lifetime annuity of $1 per period.  The annuity factor is the product of a survival 
probability and a discount rate. 
  The expected present value of an employee’s accrued retirement benefit at any 
time  s h+  prior to retirement is the expected present value of future benefits as of the 
retirement age adjusted for the probability that the worker may die prior to retirement age 
(and therefore receive no pension) and discounted to time  s h+ .  This is given by 
(5) 
) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) (
r s h i e r s h S r A s h B s h L
− + + + = + , 
where ) , ( r s h S +  is the probability that he will survive from age  s h+  to r . 
  Our interest is in the worker’s accrual of future benefits for an additional period of 
service to his employer.  This is found by taking the derivative of Eq. (5) with respect to 
s: 













+ + + =
* * 1
. 
  The first two terms in the parenthesis represent the accrual of additional pension 
benefits because of another year of service.  When an active employee works an 
additional year the expected present value of his pension grows not just because he has 
accumulated another year of service (as indicated by the first term), but also because the 
salary on which his benefit is calculated is now higher (as indicated by the second term). 
  The third and fourth terms represent amounts that accrue whether or not the 
participant in the pension plan provides another year of service; they accrue to both active 
and separated employees.  The third term represents the change in a participant’s survival   8
probability given that he has lived another period.  This will be positive because the 
survival probability is calculated over a shorter time span.  For example, the probability 
of living an additional 5 years is higher than the probability of living an additional 6 
years,  0 > ds dS .  Lastly, the fourth term represents the unwinding of the time discount, 
that is, future pension benefits are discounted one less period. 
  The investment income on the accumulated assets is expected to cover the 
increase in L due to the unwinding of the time discount.  Transfers between those who 
died during the year (and thus lost their future pension benefits) and those who survived 
are expected to cover the increase in L due to the change in the survival probability. 
  We define the expected present value of the pension benefits that accrue to a 
worker for another year of service as 
(7)  ) (
1
) , ( ) ( ) (
* *
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− + . 
From a national income accounting perspective,  N  is that part of the worker’s current 
compensation which is saved in a pension fund (measured on an accrual basis) 
corresponding to what the NIPA calls employer contributions for employee pension 
funds (which is measured on a cash basis). 
  The property income of a pension fund on an accrual basis, P , is an imputation 
equal to the product of the discount rate and the liability 
(8)  ) ( ) ( s h iL s h P + = + .   9
II.  Actuarial Perspective 
  In the previous section we derived formulae for the expected present value of the 
pension benefits that accrue to a worker for another year of service (Eq. 7) and the 
expected present value of accumulated pension benefits (Eq. 5).  These correspond to 
what actuaries for private sector pension plans call the normal cost and the plan 
termination liability of the accrued benefit funding method.
9  The plan termination 
liability depends only on mortality risk.  When other risks are considered (e.g. separation 
risk) the liability is called the plan continuation liability by actuaries and the accumulated 
benefit obligation (ABO) by accountants.
10  It corresponds to the legal obligation of the 
plan to employees should the plan be terminated.  We will use ABO in the rest of this 
paper in reference to this liability. 
  State and local retirement systems generally do not use the ABO method or 
publish its associated normal cost and liability.  Instead they use one of several funding 
methods developed by actuaries that we will refer to collectively as PBO methods.
11  
These methods, which include the entry age, projected unit credit, and aggregate 
methods, have the following features: 
•  In calculating liabilities and normal costs, these methods use a projected final 
average salary as of a worker’s retirement age,  ) (
* r W , rather than his current 
average salary,  ) (
* s h W + .   ) (
* r W  incorporates assumptions about future 
promotions, inflation, and economy-wide productivity gains (hence the reason for 
calling these projected methods). 
                                                           
9 See Eq. 5.1a in Winklevoss (1993) p.69. 
10 See Winklevoss (1993) p.176. 
11 Winklevoss (1993) p.180 appears to restrict PBO to the constant dollar version of the projected unit 
credit method.   10
•  In addition to taking into account future salary growth, these methods take into 
account future worker separations.  That is, in addition to mortality risk, these 
methods also account for separation (or termination) risk. 
•  Lastly, these methods smooth the rise in normal costs and liabilities as a worker 
ages by requiring higher employer contributions to a pension fund early in a 
worker’s career and lower contributions at the end of his career than the ABO 
method would require.  Hence the liabilities of the PBO methods, representing the 
expected present value of benefits allocated to date, are higher than the ABO 
liability and come into equality with the ABO liability only at retirement. 
  The various PBO methods differ from each other in how they allocate the 
projected benefits over a worker’s career.  The entry age method (constant percent 
version) does so in such a fashion that normal costs as a percent of salary are constant 
across the career.  The projected unit credit method (constant dollar version), on the other 
hand, allocates the accrued retirement benefit as of retirement age,  ) (r B , in equal dollar 
amounts across a worker’s career of  h r −  years.  This is seen in the following set of 
equations for the normal cost and actuarial liability for the projected unit credit method:
12 
(9) 
) ( ) ( ) , (
) (
) (
r s h i










) ( ) , (
) ( r s h i e r A r s h S
h r




) ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) (
r s h i






= +  
                                                           
12 For the projected unit credit normal cost see Eq. 6.8 in Winklevoss (1993) p.85; for the liability see Eq. 
5.6a on p.74.   11
where  N  is the normal cost and the subscript  puc indicates that it is for the projected 
unit credit method.  Note that in this equation  ) , ( r s h S +  now represents a combined 
mortality and separation risk.  The dependence of normal cost on a projection of  ) (
* r W  is 
clearly seen in Eq. (9). 
  Ex ante, the sum of expected discounted normal costs from age of hire to 
retirement age equals the accrued retirement benefit.  In practice, however, the 
experience of a pension plan will usually deviate from expectations.  In addition, plan 
provisions and assumptions may change over time so that normal costs actually 
contributed by an employer to its pension fund will not cumulate to the retirement age 
liability based on the latest version of plan.  Actuaries use the term supplemental costs to 
designate those costs which are required to balance cumulative normal costs actually 
contributed with the retirement age liability. 
  One PBO method which is used by a small number of very large public retirement 
systems is the so-called aggregate method.  In the aggregate funding method the expected 
present value of the accrued retirement benefit summed over all participants in the 
retirement plan less accumulated assets of the retirement plan,  ) ( s h X + , is divided by the 
expected present value of aggregate future salaries to obtain a “normal cost” rate.  The 
“normal cost” rate is multiplied by the aggregate salaries for a given year to obtain the 
“normal cost” for that year 
(11)  ) (
) , ( ) (
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  Although actuaries call this a normal cost, it is a fundamentally different concept 
from the normal cost of the projected unit credit and the entry age methods.  First, the   12
aggregate method does not recognize an unfunded liability.  Instead, supplemental costs 
arising from actuarial losses (deviations of experience from assumptions) or past failures 
to adequately contribute to the pension fund are amortized over the future career of a 
worker, combined with the pension cost for an additional year of service, and deemed to 
be the normal cost.  Second,  agg N  is defined in terms of the value of accumulated assets 
and so is sensitive to swings in asset prices.  Third, in order to dampen the effect of 
volatile asset prices on  agg N  it is common practice to use an actuarial value of assets (for 
example, a five-year average of the market value of assets) for  ) ( s h X +  rather than the 
market value of assets. 
  Economists have not yet reached a consensus on the correct way to measure a 
pension plan’s liability (Wilcox 2006, Brown and Wilcox 2009).  Some economists 
(Lazear 1979, Ippolito 1985, and Lazear and Moore 1988) advocate the use of PBO; 
others recommend ABO (Gold 2008); and Bodie (1990b) believes that the correct 
measure exceeds the ABO but is not the PBO.  The choice between these views is 
important because the difference between ABO and PBO liabilities can be very large. 
  The next section of the paper is empirical.  It consists of a brief presentation of the 
current unsatisfactory cash estimates of household income and wealth from state and 
local government retirement systems in the NIPA and a similar presentation of actuarial 
estimates based on data as published by the retirement systems.   13
III.  Cash and PBO Actuarial Estimates 
  A cash accounting statement of wealth and income for members of state and local 
government-administered public-employee retirement systems is presented in Table 1.  
The estimates are from the Census Bureau survey of these plans which is the basis for the 
current NIPA estimates published in Table 6.11D.
13 
  State and local government retirement systems earned about $145 billion on their 
investments in 2000 (line 3 plus line 9).  Declining equity prices and low interest rates 
substantially reduced financial returns for these systems in the following two years.  They 
sustained holding losses of $77.9 billion in 2001 and $69.6 billion in 2002.  As a 
consequence, employer contributions rose sharply in subsequent years (line 2).  From an 
average of $40.1 billion per year in 2000-02, employer contributions rose 69% to $67.8 
billion in 2006.
14  Relative to payroll, employer contributions rose from 8.00% in 2000 to 
10.84% in 2006 (line 16). 
  The PBO actuarial estimates in this section are based on a sample of 124 of the 
largest state and local government retirement systems, representing 91% of the 
membership in all systems as reported in the 2002 Census Bureau census of state and 
local government-administered public-employee retirement systems.
15  S o m e  s m a l l e r  
systems were added to the sample in order that it might account for at least 75% of 
                                                           
13  Since fiscal years for most state and local governments end on June 30, we converted the Census 
estimates to calendar years by a simple average of adjacent years. 
14 Among state and local government retirement systems in the US it is common for a portion of the 
contributions made to pension funds to be deducted from salaries (the employee’s contribution) and a 
portion (the employer’s contribution) to be paid over and above the employee’s salary.  Employee 
contributions averaged $27.2 billion per year from 2000-02 and increased 25% to $34.0 billion in 2006 
(line 19). 
15 Membership is a count of active and inactive members and all beneficiaries receiving periodic payments 
(retired on age, service, or disability as well as survivors of deceased members), but not lump sum 
recipients.  The actuarial data were collected by BEA primarily from the comprehensive annual financial 
reports and actuarial valuation reports of the systems.  The fiscal year data in these reports were converted   14
membership in almost every state.  Aggregate amounts reported in the tables below are 
sums and averages of the sampled systems weighted by membership to represent the 
entire population. 
  Ninety-eight of the sampled retirement systems published an actuarial liability 
based on the entry age funding method, 21 used the projected unit credit method, 2 used 
the frozen initial liability (aka frozen entry age) method, 2 used the aggregate method and 
1 used the frozen attained age. 
  Some retirement systems recently switched their funding method to the entry age 
method.  We extrapolated the new entry age liability back to 2000 using Eq. (12).   
(12)  t t t t t t t iB B N L i N L L 2
1
1 1 ) ( − − + + + = − −  
where  B  represents the benefits paid by the retirement system and i is the discount rate 
used by the system.  This equation requires an estimate of entry age normal cost for the 
earlier years.  Since normal cost rates are relatively stable over time unless large changes 
are made to plan provisions or actuarial or economic assumptions, we assumed that the 
new entry age normal cost rate (normal cost divided by covered payroll) was a reasonable 
approximation of the normal cost rate in earlier years as well.  Multiplying it by covered 
payroll provided an estimate of N  while an estimate of B  was obtained from the 
financial reports of the systems.
16 
  Table 2 presents summary PBO measures of wealth and income for 2000-06.  It 
combines, without adjustment, estimates of actuarial liabilities and normal costs 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to calendar years by averaging, taking into account differences in system fiscal years.  For more details see 
the data appendix. 
16 Details about other adjustments that were made to the data for individual retirement systems are provided 
in the appendix.   15
calculated using different funding methods.
17  In the measurement of actuarial income, 
employer’s normal cost is used rather than the employer contributions used in the 
measurement of cash income.  Employer’s normal cost was $41.0 billion in 2000 and 
rose to $51.7 billion in 2006 (line 2) about 8.3% of covered payroll in both years (line 
13).  This contrasts with the rise in employer cash contributions from 8.0% in 2000 to 
10.8% in 2006 in response to very low returns on assets. 
  Imputed interest income (line 3) is computed using the assumed investment rate 
of return from actuarial valuation reports and the actuarial liability.  The weighted 
average interest rate is very stable at about 8% (line 14) while the actuarial liability rises 
from $2.2 trillion in 2000 to $3.3 trillion in 2006 (line 6).  Together they yield interest 
income which rises steadily from $178 billion in 2000 to $262 billion in 2006.  Again this 
contrasts with cash property income (dividends and interest), which declined in 2001 and 
2002. 
  Table 2, Line 9 also shows that over this period plan assets have been about 2 to 
16% lower than their actuarial liabilities, with the smallest unfunded liability occurring in 
2000 before the effects of the unfavorable investment returns were felt and the largest 
unfunded liability occurring in 2002 as employers began increasing their contributions.
18 
                                                           
17 Note that under cash accounting DB pension plans are in the household sector, so pension assets are part 
of household wealth and the operations of the plans are an activity of households.  Therefore the 
administrative and investment expenses of the plans are included in household income (and household 
consumption).  Under accrual accounting, the plans are in the sector of the employer (state and local 
government) and so the administrative and investment expenses are not part of household income nor 
household consumption. 
18 The unfunded liability should be interpreted carefully because of the relationship between a retirement 
system and its sponsoring government.  The size of a retirement system’s unfunded liability depends on 
how and where the sponsoring government wishes to record its liabilities.  For instance, by issuing pension 
obligation bonds and contributing the proceeds to the fiduciary fund for its retirement systems, the state of 
Illinois increased the assets of the systems and reduced their unfunded liabilities.  The liability represented 
by the bonds was recorded on the statement of net assets of the sponsoring (primary) government.   
Although this maneuver appears to improve the finances of the retirement systems there has been no net 
change for the state government in its entirety.   16
  Table 3 presents the annual required contribution (ARC), a measure required by 
GASB.  ARC is defined as the employer’s normal cost plus an amount to amortize the 
unfunded liability in 30 or fewer years.
19  Employers contributed about 90% of the 
required amount in 2000, but even with the sharp rise in the contributions subsequently, 
the percent of ARC contributed fell continuously to 81% in 2005 before rising to 83% in 
2006. 
  Lastly, Table 3 also presents the distribution of the actuarial liability between 
active members (lines 3 and 5) and retirees and beneficiaries (line 4).  The bottom panel 
displays the distribution as percentage shares.  The retiree and beneficiary share rose 
from 44.85% in 2000 to 50.58% in 2006.  (These estimates are based on a smaller sample 
than the estimates in Table 2; thirty-two of the retirement systems in the sample did not 
report the solvency test results on which Table 3 is based.) 
  In the next section we discuss the conversion of the PBO actuarial estimates into 
ABO estimates. 
                                                           
19 In practice the periods and methods used by retirement systems vary considerably making comparisons 
between ARCs of different retirement systems difficult.   17
IV.  ABO Estimates 
  In this section we discuss the estimation of ABO normal costs and liabilities.
20  
Two estimation strategies were considered.  The first strategy is to use the equations 
developed in Section 1 and data on retirement system membership and plan provisions to 
directly estimate the ABO normal costs and liabilities.  A shortcoming of this approach is 
that the equations pertain only to retirement benefits and ignore survivorship, death, and 
disability benefits.  Furthermore retirement systems commonly have multiple tiers for 
which crucial parameters vary, requiring substantially greater data collection effort. 
  The second strategy is to use the equations of Section 2 as well as those of Section 
1 together with a set of assumptions about member and plan characteristics to estimate a 
relationship between the PBO funding methods and the ABO method.  One advantage of 
this approach is that it ties the resulting ABO estimates to published PBO measures 
which are based on complete details of membership, plan provisions, and types of 
benefits.  Another advantage is that it requires the collection of fewer items for each 
retirement system that the direct approach.  Although the relationship between the ABO 
and PBO measures is sensitive to the assumptions made, choosing them with care can 
yield useful results.  This is the strategy adopted in this paper. 
  The strategy is implemented in two steps.  First, PBO measures are collected from 
actuarial and financial reports of the retirement systems and converted to ABO estimates 
by simulating ABO and PBO pension models for individual workers with different 
age/service characteristics.  Normal costs and liabilities are then weighted by the 
distribution of active employees by age and length of service and conversion ratios 
calculated.  The liability conversion ratio is the liability computed using the ABO method   18
divided by the liability computed using one of the PBO methods.  A similar conversion 
ratio is calculated for normal costs.  The ratios change over time as the age/service 
distribution of employment changes.  Multiplying a retirement system’s published 
liability and normal cost by the relevant conversion ratio yields the ABO measure we are 
seeking.  In the second step of the process, standardization on a common discount rate, 
the ABO estimates are multiplied by discount rate conversion factors based on formulae 
developed by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. 
  Conversion of PBO Estimates to ABO Estimates.
21  We selected parameters 
similar to those used by state and local government retirement systems:  Present values 
are calculated assuming an 8% discount rate; pension benefits are equal to 2% of the 
average salary in the final five years of employment times the number of years of 
service;
22 age of hire varies from 20 to 55; retirement age is 65; the entry salary for a 
worker hired at age 20 is $25,000; salaries rise 1% per year due to economy-wide 
productivity growth; in addition, an individual worker’s salary rises with age.  This is 
represented by a salary scale in which a 64-year old worker earns 2.8 times as much as a 
20-year old.
23  Mortality is based on the male RP-2000 mortality tables for employees 
                                                                                                                                                                             
20 See Gold and Latter (2008) and Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009) for alternative approaches. 
21 We use the ABO liabilities published by the New York City retirement systems in their comprehensive 
annual financial reports; all the other retirement systems in our sample publish PBO liabilities. 
22 The Teacher Retirement System of Texas and the Florida Retirement System are examples of systems 
that use the average of the five highest years of earnings.  Brainard (2006 p.7) reports that the median 
multiplier for employees who participate in OASDI is .0185 while the median multiplier for those do not 
participate is .0220. 
23 The salary scale is from Winklevoss (1993) Table 2.10, p.27.  The salary assumptions mean that a 
worker’s salary depends on his age but not on his years of service: 
 
) 20 ( ) 20 ( ) ( ) (
− + + = +
s h e W s h s h W
ρ σ  
Where  ) ( s h+ σ  is the salary scale, ρ  is the rate of productivity growth, and  ) 20 ( W  is the entry age 
salary for a 20 year old.   19
and healthy annuitants prepared by the Society of Actuaries.  Disability decrements and 
separation decrements (which vary by age of hire) are from Winklevoss (1993).
24 
  Estimates of the ABO and projected unit credit liabilities for various ages and 
years of service are presented in Panels A and B of Table 4.  These are expressed as a 
percentage of the age 65 liability, which is the same for both funding methods.  The rapid 
growth of the liability with a given worker’s age is seen by reading along the diagonals of 
Panel A.  For instance, the ABO liability for a worker age 27 with 7 years of service is 
only 0.03% of his age 65 liability.  It remains low for most of his career—even at age 57 
(with 37 years of service) it is only 32.43% of the age 65 liability.  Because the projected 
unit credit method was designed to smooth the backloaded trajectory of the ABO liability 
it is higher than the ABO liability at every age—as is apparent from Panel C. 
  Similar estimates of normal costs by age and years of service are presented in 
Table 5.  From Panel C it is clear that projected unit credit normal costs are higher than 
ABO normal costs at the beginning of a worker’s career and lower at the end. 
  The assumed distribution of workers by age and years of service in 2000 and 2006 
are presented in Table 6.  In 2000 the average worker was 43 years old and had worked 
8.3 years for the plan sponsor (Panel C).  In 2006 the average worker was 44.4 years only 
and had 8.5 years of tenure.  These age/service distributions were used to calculate a 
weighted average of the ratio of ABO liabilities and normal costs to the liabilities and 
normal costs of the other funding methods (Table 7).  The ABO/projected unit credit 
liability ratio rises from 0.77 in 2000 to 0.81 in 2006.  The ABO/entry age ratio is lower 
                                                           
24 The termination decrements are from Table 2.3, p.19 and the disability decrements are from Table 2.7 
p.23.   20
but it also rises over time.  The normal cost ratios are mostly above one during this 
period. 
  As noted, these conversion ratios are sensitive to the assumptions used, in 
particular the assumptions about wage growth.  Using the same salary scale assumption 
as before but assuming that economy-wide wages increase at a 2% annual rate (rather 
than 1%) reduces the conversion ratios to those given in Panel B.  This assumption does 
not affect the ABO liability or normal cost but raises the liabilities and normal costs of 
the other methods which are based on a projected final year average salary.  The 
ABO/EA conversion ratio for 2006 is reduced from 0.56 to 0.52 while the ABO/PUC 
ratio is reduced from 0.81 to 0.74. 
  Lastly, it should be noted that in making the conversion, it is necessary to adjust 
only the actuarial liability for active employees; the actuarial liabilities for inactive 
employees who have separated or for beneficiaries are identical under all funding 
methods. 
  Conversion to Common Discount Rate.  Bader and Gold (2003), Wilcox (2006 
pp.253-6), Novy-Marx and Rauh (2008) and others have criticized current actuarial 
practice that uses an investment rate of return to discount future pension liabilities of state 
and local government retirement systems. 
  For funding purposes, Wilcox recommends that liabilities should be discounted 
using the risk free nominal yield curve, or if that is not possible, a single risk-free rate.  
He assumes that taxpayers will bail out an insolvent plan.  Historically, state and local 
pension plans, unlike private plans, have always paid their pension obligations in full, 
even when bondholders of bankrupt state and local governments have sustained losses.   21
  The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation has developed formulae for changing 
the discount rate assumption embedded in an actuarial liability.  The “termination” 
formula for the actuarial liability to retired participants is  
(13) 
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and the formula for the liability to active and separated participants is  
(14) 
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where i is the discount rate on which the liability was originally calculated and 
* i  is the 
desired discount rate. 
  Having converted the PBO liabilities to ABO liabilities as described in the 
previous section, and relying on Eq. (7) which shows that the ABO normal cost is 
proportional to the ABO liability, we use the same discount rate conversion formulae for 
normal costs and for liabilities.  The discount rate conversions can have a very large 
effect on the estimates.  For instance, when converting from the typical 8% discount rate 
assumed by state and local government retirement systems to a 5% risk free market rate, 
A ρ  equals 1.6 and  R ρ  equals 1.2. 
  Results using the market yield on 20-year Treasury securities are presented in 
Table 8.  They depict different saving behavior than the cash and PBO estimates.   
Employer’s normal cost using the ABO method was $55.5 billion in 2000 (line 2), 40% 
higher than employer cash contributions and 35% higher than PBO normal cost.
25  ABO 
                                                           
25 As an example of the conversion of liabilities and normal costs from a PBO basis to ABO, consider the 
case of the California Public Employees Retirement System which used the entry age funding method and a 
7.75% discount rate in its June 30, 2006 valuation.  It reported an annual covered payroll of $38,047 
million, an employer’s normal cost rate of 10.548%, and an actuarial accrued liability of $228,131 million, 
of which $111,400 million was for terminated employees, retirees, and beneficiaries.  Employer’s normal 
cost was $4.01 billion (38.047 x .10548) on a PBO basis.  The entry-age conversion factor for normal costs 
from Table 7 is 1.145 and  A ρ =1.428 to convert from the 7.75% discount rate used by the System to a   22
normal cost grew at a compound rate of 7.5% from 2000-06.  As a percentage of covered 
payroll, employer’s normal cost was 11% to 14% in 2000-06 (line 12).  This contrasts 
with PBO normal cost which was approximately 8.3% of covered payroll and employer 
cash contributions which were 7% to 11% of payroll. 
  Imputed interest in 2000 was $112.7 billion (line 3), substantially more than the 
$83.1 billion cash estimate of property income but less than the $178.3 billion imputed 
interest on the PBO liability.  Imputed interest on the ABO liability grew at a 6.7% 
compound rate 2000-06. 
  Household saving in DB pension plans rose over this period at a 4.9% rate, or 
from $93.4 to $124.3 billion per year (line 5).  This contrasts with large decelerations and 
accelerations in saving when measured on a cash basis and a growing level of annual 
saving when measured on an actuarial basis (from $144.6 billion in 2000 to $186.2 
billion in 2006). 
  The ABO liability was $2.02 trillion in 2000 (line 6).  This was less than the 
$2.16 trillion assets held by the retirement systems (line 7).  However, the $144 billion 
surplus in 2000 became a $112 billion deficit in 2001 (line 8).  Subsequently, the deficit 
grew to $527 billion in 2003 but by 2006 it had fallen to $289 billion. 
  Table 9 presents a similar set of estimates but uses a constant 6% discount rate, 
the same rate as used by the private sector on their Form 5500 filings.  Because the 
discount rate is consistently higher than the market rate used in Table 8, the liability and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5.38% market discount rate.  ABO normal costs are therefore $6.56 billion (4.01 x 1.145 x 1.428), 64% 
higher than entry age normal costs. 
  The ABO liability is calculated by multiplying the PBO liability toward active employees by the 
entry age conversion factor for liabilities from Table 7 (.563) and  A ρ  to get $93.8 billion ((228.131-
111.400) x .563 x 1.428).  To this is added the liability toward other members, adjusted to the market   23
normal cost are lower.  The constant discount rate smoothes some of the swings over time 
in Table 8.  For instance, employer’s normal cost as a percentage of covered payroll 
ranges from 11% to 12% in Table 9 versus a range of 11% to 14% in Table 8. 
  Cost of Living Adjustments.  Although most state and local pension plans 
provide automatic cost of living adjustments (COLA) to retirement benefits, none were 
fully indexed and most had a cap of 3% per year or less.  As indicated in Table 10, 93 of 
the systems in our sample provide automatic COLAs while 31 did not.
26  Of those with 
automatic COLAs, 34 were independent of the rate of inflation.  For instance, the Florida 
Retirement System increases retirement benefits 3% per year regardless of the rate of 
inflation and the COLA in the Wisconsin Retirement System is dependent on the actual 
rate of return on assets exceeding the assumed rate of return (among other things).  Of the 
58 systems with COLAs dependent on the rate of inflation, 36 are capped at 3% per year 
or less (often with carryover provisions from years when inflation exceeds 3% to years 
when it is less than 3%).  Four systems do not have a cap, but their COLAs are only a 
percentage of the inflation rate.  For instance, the Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund of 
New Jersey provides a COLA equal to 60% of the change in the CPI with no cap.
27 
  In practice, then, even when a retirement plan has an automatic COLA dependent 
on the rate of inflation, the cap is usually so low that it is likely to be binding and the 
maximum cost of living adjustment always made.  It will be convenient to assume that all 
COLAs in state and local government retirement plans are similar to Florida’s constant 
                                                                                                                                                                             
discount rate using  R ρ .  This liability is $126.6 billion (111.4 x 1.136).  The total ABO liability is then 
$220.4 billion (93.8 + 126.6), 3.4% less than the entry age liability. 
26 However, many systems without automatic COLAs provide occasional ad hoc COLAs. 
27 This summary glosses over various other complex COLA provisions in some state and local government 
pension plans.  For instance, many plans do not compound COLAs.  Other plans limit COLAs to only a   24
annual increase.  It can be easily shown that if this is the case, the normal cost and 
liability conversion factors in Table 7 are unchanged.  If the retirement benefit increases 
at a constant rate of π  then the expression for the annuity factor given in Eq. (4) can be 
written as 
(15)  da e a r S r A
r a i
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This raises the liability given by Eq. (5) and normal costs given by Eq. (7) in the same 
proportion it raises the liability given by Eq. (10) and normal costs given by Eq. (9).  In 
other words, the liability and normal cost ratios are unchanged. 
  State Estimates.  Table 11 presents estimates of normal costs as a percentage of 
covered payroll by state.
28  These estimates are based on the constant 6% discount rate 
assumption.  There is substantial variation across states in these costs.  At the low end in 
2006 are Rhode Island and Massachusetts (both 5.1%).  At the high end are the District of 
Columbia (27.7%) and Nevada (26.7%).  Nevada is one of the states whose state and 
local government employees do not participate in social security and hence their 
employers do not pay the 6.2% social security payroll tax.  However, the same is true of 
Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Ohio, all of which have below average 
normal cost rates. 
  There is even greater variation in normal costs relative to current cash estimates.  
In 2006, the normal costs and cash contributions in Texas were approximately equal.  In 
                                                                                                                                                                             
portion of the retirement benefit (for instance, the first $12,000 or excluding the amount based on employee 
contributions). 
28 In converting the PBO estimates to ABO estimates we used the same set of assumptions for all retirement 
systems.  Although it might be worthwhile to use system-specific assumptions, particularly regarding 
average age and years of service of active workers, the gain must be balanced against the cost of collecting 
the relevant data, which in many cases is not even published.  The gain is likely to be greatest for 
retirement systems for police and firemen.  Even so, they are a relatively small subset of the population.   25
contrast, normal costs in New Jersey were more than 21 times as much as the current 
cash estimates ($2.51 billion versus $119 million).   26
V.  Conclusions 
  The need for actuarial measures of pension compensation and wealth has long 
been recognized.
29  One difficulty has been that state and local government pension plans 
in the U.S. generally do not publish the actuarial measures needed for national income 
accounts and the measures they do publish are not based on a consistent set of funding 
methods and assumptions. 
  This paper developed a method to convert PBO normal costs and liabilities to the 
ABO measures needed for national income accounts using a common discount rate.  The 
method was applied to data for the years 2000 to 2006 to generate a set of national and 
state estimates.  Not surprisingly, the ABO estimates are quite different from the 
currently published cash and actuarial estimates. 
  Estimates of ABO normal costs and liabilities based on a market discount rate 
could be higher or lower than published normal costs and liabilities for several reasons.  
(1) The discount rate used by state and local government retirement systems is usually 
substantially above the market discount rate as represented by the yield on risk free 
treasury securities, making published estimates smaller than market based estimates.  (2) 
The funding methods used by state and local governments in the U.S. are variations of 
the projected benefit obligation (PBO) method which takes into account future salary 
                                                           
29 “It is difficult to carry out economic analysis based primarily on accrual concepts in a world where 
activity is reported on a cash basis.  Particularly in the pension area, the personal income and saving 
statistics produced by the National Income and Product Accounts differ substantially from the concepts 
used in most economic analyses.  In the corporate sector, cash accounting tends to distort the measurement 
of pension commitments and thereby corporate profits.  Accounts based on cash also fail to recognize the 
relationship between the federal government and the household and business sectors created by the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation insurance.  Finally, tax expenditure estimates based solely on a cash flow 
analysis do not provide an accurate measure of the benefits of the tax-favored treatment of pensions. 
  “The time is right for improving the data on pensions.  Great strides have been made in the area of 
cross-sectional surveys of individuals; these improvements should permit better estimates of the extent to 
which employees reduce their other saving in response to guaranteed pension benefits.  Comparable   27
increases.  In contrast, the preferred measure in this paper is an accumulated benefit 
obligation (ABO) which ignores future salary increases.  This makes PBO estimates 
larger than the ABO estimates.  (3)  As shown in Section II, PBO funding methods 
smooth the rise in normal costs which occurs over a worker’s career.  All else equal, this 
makes the ABO liability lower than the PBO liability except at the age of retirement 
when they are equal.  On the other hand, it makes ABO normal costs lower than PBO 
normal costs in the early years of a career and higher than PBO normal costs at the end of 
a career. 
  The net effect of these factors in 2006 is that the ABO liability (assuming a 6% 
discount rate) is about 4% lower than the PBO liability and ABO normal costs are almost 
50% higher than PBO normal costs. 
  In addition to national estimates, estimates were prepared for states, across which 
there is substantial variation.  For instance, ABO normal costs ranged from 27% above 
PBO normal cost in New York in 2006 to 73% above in Minnesota and New Hampshire.  
ABO normal costs ranged from 5% of covered payroll in Rhode Island and 
Massachusetts to 27% in Nevada (and 28% in the District of Columbia). 
  Adopting actuarial accounting for employer contributions to DB pension plans in 
the state and local government sector will have a large effect on NIPA measures of 
compensation and personal income receipts on assets.  We estimate that employer 
contributions to pension funds in 2000 would be 39% higher than the NIPA cash estimate 
and 17% higher in 2006 (Table 12).  As a percent of compensation, employer 
contributions would be 7.7% on an actuarial basis rather than 6.7% on a cash basis.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
improvements are needed at the macro level; revising our national accounts to make use of available data 
should be given high priority” (Munnell and Yohn 1992).   28
property income of state and local government retirement plans (attributed to households 
in the NIPA) would be 41% higher than the cash estimate in 2000 and nearly twice as 
high in 2006.  Together the two changes would add $51 billion (or 0.6%) to total personal 
income in 2000 and $105 billion (1.0%) in 2006. 
  Across states the adoption of actuarial accounting would raise personal income in 
2006 by as much as 2.3% (in New Jersey) and lower personal income by as much 0.7% 
(in West Virginia—see Table 13).  The reduction of personal income in West Virginia 
(and even larger reductions in Oregon in 2002-04) reflect the fact that personal income 
counts as current income the large lump sum contributions those states made to reduce 
the unfunded actuarial liabilities of their retirement systems that arose because 
contributions in prior years were insufficient.  Similarly, the pension obligation bonds 
Illinois issued to improve the financial statements of its retirements systems raised the 
state’s 2003 personal income as currently measured but would have no effect on personal 
income if the proposed actuarial accounting is adopted. 
  The ABO estimates presented here are dependent on the quality of the data 
published by the retirement systems and the consistency with which different retirement 
systems apply a given actuarial funding method.  Although estimates for many systems 
are based on complete information from 2000 to the present, estimates for other systems 
are based on a single year of primary data which we extrapolated back to 2000 assuming 
a constant normal cost rate.  Even over the short six year period considered in this paper, 
there has been some improvement in the availability and quality of the underlying 
actuarial data.  For example, some systems which use the aggregate actuarial funding 
method have begun publishing entry age normal costs and liabilities.   29
Appendix: Notes on the Data 
 General.    Some of the data used in this paper (actuarial liability, covered payroll, 
annual required contribution, investment rate of return, employer’s normal cost, and the 
distribution of the actuarial liability between active and retired members, cost of living 
adjustments) were collected directly from the Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports 
(CAFR) and Actuarial Valuation Reports (AVR) of the retirement systems.  Usually 
actuarial valuations are performed every year but some systems perform them every other 
year. 
  The actuarial valuation dates for most retirement systems is June 30
th; a common 
alternative valuation date is December 31
st.  A few systems use other valuation dates.  
Fiscal year data were converted to calendar years using a weighted average of adjacent 
years, the weights depending on the system’s fiscal year.  (Fiscal year data from the 
Census Bureau survey were converted to calendar years assuming that all systems used a 
June 30
th fiscal year.) 
  Normal Cost.  By design, normal cost is rather stable from year to year unless 
plan provisions, economic assumptions (e.g. interest, inflation, and wage rates), or 
actuarial assumptions (separation, retirement, mortality, and disability rates), are 
substantially changed.  Therefore it was felt reasonable to extrapolate normal cost to a 
common 2000-06 sample period for all systems (when actual data were missing) by 
holding the normal cost rate constant and multiplying it by covered payroll. 
  The actuarial valuation reports we examined typically use payroll and other data 
as of the valuation date to calculate a normal cost rate for a future fiscal year.  For 
instance, the June 30, 2007 AVR for the Vermont State Employees’ Retirement System   30
reports the calculations of a normal cost rate for the 2010 fiscal year.  As a general rule, 
we used the normal cost rate calculated using data as of the valuation date as an estimate 
of the normal cost rate for the year ending on that valuation date.  In the Vermont 
example, we used the normal cost rate calculated for fiscal year 2010 as an estimate of 
the normal cost rate for the year ending June 30, 2007.  This is correct (for an individual) 
when the entry age funding method is used because the normal cost rate is the same for 
every year of that individual’s career.  For the system, the rate will not be identical every 
year because the composition of active members changes, but the rate will nevertheless 
usually be stable.  This means that we can multiply the normal cost rate by the covered 
payroll for the year ending on the valuation date to estimate normal cost for that year. 
  For the systems that did not use either the entry age or the projected unit credit 
funding methods, we made adjustments and assumptions such as: 
•  Wisconsin’s official actuarial method is the frozen initial liability but it also 
publishes some entry age estimates in its valuation report.  In this paper we used 
the published entry age liability and normal cost and calculated an unfunded 
“actuarial accrued liability” (AAL) as the difference between the entry age 
liability and the actuarial value of assets.  We then amortized the “unfunded 
actuarial accrued liability” (UAAL) over 30 years using a constant dollar 
amortization payment and added the amortization payment to the entry age 
normal cost to obtain an entry age annual required contribution (ARC). 
•  The State Teachers Retirement System of Vermont and the Vermont State 
Employees’ Retirement System adopted the entry age funding method in their 
June 30, 2006 valuation reports.  Formerly they used the frozen initial liability   31
method.  We used the entry age normal cost rate from the 2006 report for all 
earlier years. 
•  South Dakota and North Carolina Local Governmental use the frozen initial 
liability.  They do not publish an entry age AAL.  We treated their published 
actuarial data as if they were entry age. 
•  The Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System (consisting of two plans: the 
State employees, Teachers, & Higher Education Employees Pension Plan 
(SETHEEPP) and the Political Subdivisions Pension Plan (PSPP)) began 
publishing an entry age AAL in its June 30, 2008 CAFR.  Previously it published 
a frozen initial liability AAL.  We estimated a normal cost for the system for 2007 
as a weighted average of the published normal cost rates for State and Higher 
Education participants and for Teacher participants (a normal cost for PSPP 
participants was not published).  The weights were estimated from the data in the 
schedule of active members by salary.  We assumed that the normal cost rate for 
earlier years was equal to the 2007 rate.  We then estimated an entry age AAL for 
earlier years using Eq. (12). 
•  The New York City (NYC) Police, Fire, Teachers’, and Employees’ retirement 
systems use the frozen initial liability funding method but they also publish a 
“market value accumulated benefit obligation.”  This is the accrued liability that 
we are attempting to estimate.  Unfortunately the NYC systems do not also 
publish a corresponding normal cost.  We roughly calculated these costs using Eq. 
(12) and other data published in the NYC CAFRS.    32
•  The District of Columbia Police, Fire, and Teachers systems use the aggregate 
funding method.  They also began publishing an entry age AAL as of October 1, 
2006.  We roughly calculated an entry age normal cost rate by subtracting the 
entry age UAAL from the present value of future employer normal costs (the 
published amount based on the aggregate method) and dividing the result by the 
present value of future payroll.  Then using Eq. (12) we calculated an entry age 
AAL for 2000-2005.  Using these estimates of entry age normal cost and entry 
age AAL, we calculated an entry age ARC, assuming a level dollar amortization 
payment. 
  Several adjustments were necessary to enforce consistency between the normal 
cost data collected for the various retirement systems: 
•  The Government Accounting Standards Board requires that covered payroll for 
the system be published in a Schedule of Funding Progress.  In most cases, this is 
the payroll used in this paper to calculate normal cost.  Some retirement systems 
(e.g. Florida Retirement System and Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama) 
include DROP salaries in covered payroll, but not in the payroll used to calculate 
normal cost.  In the case of the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama, covered 
payroll was 12.5% higher than the valuation payroll in 2005.  For these systems, 
we used valuation payroll rather than covered payroll to estimate normal cost. 
•  Sometimes administrative expenses are included in the published normal cost rate 
(e.g. Florida Retirement System); other times they are omitted (e.g. Teachers' 
Retirement System of Alabama); and in some cases it is not known (e.g. Kansas   33
Public Employees Retirement System).  Where necessary we adjust normal cost 
to exclude administrative costs. 
•  Sometimes death benefits and term life insurance are omitted from the published 
normal cost rate (e.g. Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama).  We adjusted it 
to include those costs.  The Texas Municipal Retirement System has an optional 
supplemental death benefits (term life insurance) plan.  We included the cost of 
this plan in the employer’s normal cost. 
•  Some systems (e.g. Teacher's Retirement System of Oklahoma) include the cost 
of medical benefits in normal cost.  We removed that cost when it could be 
identified. 
•  Some systems (e.g. Kansas Public Employees Retirement System, Oklahoma 
Public Employees Retirement System) include interest in the normal cost rate 
because the employer contribution is not due until some time after the valuation 
date.  We excluded these interest payments. 
•  Some systems (e.g. California Teachers' Retirement System) do not publish 
employer’s normal cost or employer’s normal cost rate.  They publish a total 
normal cost and a member contribution rate.  The statutorily set member and 
employer contribution rates will only by chance equal the normal cost rate.  How 
the difference between the normal cost rate and the statutory rates will be paid is 
unspecified.  We arbitrarily defined the employer’s normal cost rate as the total 
rate less the statutory members’ rate. 
•  Some systems (e.g. Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund) exclude from normal cost 
those contributions to the retirement fund that were not made by the employer or   34
the members.  In the case of the Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund there are state 
“subsidies” that are omitted from the published normal cost.  We added these 
subsidies to normal cost. 
•  Some systems (e.g. State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio) include in the 
covered payroll published in the Schedule of Funding Progress the salaries paid to 
members who participate only in a defined contribution plan.  We estimated 
normal cost by multiplying the normal cost rate by a valuation payroll which 
excluded such salaries. 
•  Some systems (e.g. Alaska Teachers’ Retirement System beginning with the June 
30, 2006 valuation date) use an annualized payroll rather than a fiscal year 
payroll. 
•  In some systems (e.g. Employees’ Retirement System of Georgia) the employer 
pays the employee contribution.  This is known as “pick-up.”  We assumed that 
QCEW wages do not reflect this employer pick-up and treated the pick-up as 
another component of the employer normal cost.   35
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Table 1.  Household wealth in, and income from, state and local government defined benefit pension plans: Cash accounting 
approach
1 
Billions of dollars (or as noted) 
           
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1  Household  Income  122.6 109.5 110.6 128.6 141.0 147.8 161.2 
2    Employer contributions to DB pension  plans  39.5 38.8 42.1 53.1 59.8 60.9 67.8 
3    Property income from plan assets (gross of 
  investment  and  administrative  expenses)
2  83.1 70.6 68.5 75.5 81.3 86.9 93.4 
4  Less: Investment  and  administrative  expenses  6.0 7.5 7.6 7.6 9.0  10.0  12.5 
5  Less: Benefits net of employee contributions  74.7  82.7  91.6 101.1 109.3 117.4 127.5 
6    Benefits  and  Withdrawals  100.4 109.6 119.6 130.5 140.1 149.0 160.5 
7    Employee  contributions  25.7 27.0 27.9 29.4 30.8 31.6 33.0 
8  Equals: Household  saving  in  DB  plans  42.0 19.3 11.3 19.8 22.7 20.4 21.2 
9  Plus: Holding gains or loss on plan assets  61.8  -77.9  -69.6  113.6  201.8  187.7  288.0 
10  Plus: Net transfers and other changes   22.0  53.2  47.4  24.7  29.2  -9.9  50.7 
11  Equals: Change in DB plan assets  125.8  -5.3  -10.9  158.1  253.8  198.2  359.9 
12  Closing DB plan assets
3  2,163.1 2,157.8 2,146.9 2,305.0 2,558.8 2,757.0 3,116.9 
           
  Addenda:         
13 Active  membership  (millions)  13.5 13.8 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.2 14.4 
14 Total  membership  (millions)  22.4 23.2 23.9 24.3 24.8 25.4 26.1 
15  Covered  payroll  493.6 521.6 542.7 556.9 573.3 596.0 625.7 
16  Employer contributions as a % of covered payroll  8.00 7.44 7.75 9.53  10.42  10.22  10.84 
17  Employer  contributions  (6.11D,  30)  39.6 38.8 41.8 56.1 55.4 61.9 65.3 
18  Benefits  (6.11D,  43)  100.3 109.6 120.6 131.9 140.6 149.7 161.6 
19  Employee contributions (6.11D,  52)  25.8 27.1 28.6 30.1 31.1 32.3 34.0 
Notes: 
 
1Data in this table are based on a tabulation of the data in the "Individual Unit File" from the Census Bureau surveys of state and 
local government administered public-employee retirement systems; BEA's National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA); and 
covered payroll data collected as described in the text.  NIPA table and line numbers are in parentheses. 
 
2Property income is dividends, interest, and rent. 
 
3Total cash and investment holdings. 
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Table 2.  Household wealth in, and income from, state and local government defined benefit pension plans: PBO approach
1  
Flows are measured for years ending on December 31; stocks are measured as of December 31. 
Billions of dollars (or as noted) 
           
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1  Household  income  219.3 236.2 251.7 265.2 278.6 294.7 313.6 
2    Employer's normal cost (net of administrative  
  expense)
2  41.0 43.9 46.1 46.9 47.4 49.0 51.7 
3    Imputed interest on actuarial liability
3  178.3 192.3 205.7 218.3 231.2 245.7 261.9 
4  Less: Benefits net of employee contributions  74.7  82.7  91.6 101.1 109.3 117.4 127.5 
5  Equals: Household saving in DB pension plans  144.6 153.6 160.1 164.1 169.2 177.3 186.2 
6  Actuarial liability of DB plans
2  2,218.1 2,393.3 2,560.7 2,730.6 2,902.4 3,088.3 3,296.3 
7  Plan assets (market value)
4  2,163.1 2,157.8 2,146.9 2,305.0 2,558.8 2,757.0 3,116.9 
8  Unfunded actuarial liability  55.0 235.5 413.8 425.6 343.6 331.2 179.3 
9  Funded  ratio  (%)  97.52 90.16 83.84 84.41 88.16 89.27 94.56 
           
  Addenda:         
11  Unfunded actuarial liability as a percentage of  
  covered  payroll  11.13 45.16 76.25 76.43 59.94 55.58 28.66 
12  Employer's  normal  cost  per  active  member  (dollars)  3,034 3,171 3,276 3,334 3,362 3,440 3,582 
13  Employer's normal cost as a % of covered payroll  8.31  8.42  8.49  8.43  8.27  8.22  8.26 
14  Investment rate of return assumption (%)  8.04  8.04  8.03  7.99  7.96  7.95  7.95 
N o t e s :            
 
1Estimates are based on a sample of retirement systems, weighted by membership to represent the entire population, as described 
in the text. 
 
2Liabilities and normal costs as reported by the retirement systems using entry age, projected unit cost, or other funding methods.  
 
3Using investment rate of return assumed by retirement systems (line 14). 
 
4Total cash and investment holdings. 
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Table 3.  Annual required contribution and solvency test results
1,2 
  Flows are measured for years ending on December 31. 
  Billions of dollars (or as noted) 
           
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1  Annual  required  contribution  (ARC)  36.9 38.5 42.5 51.2 61.9 69.4 75.7 
2  Percent  contributed  90.01 87.46 82.84 81.74 81.71 81.19 83.01 
           
Billions of dollars 
3  Active  Member  Contributions  331.9 348.0 364.7 376.5 394.3 412.8 433.6 
4  Retirees  &  Beneficiaries  994.9 1083.6 1184.1 1301.3 1429.8 1547.0 1667.1 
5  Active Members (Employer Financed Portion)  891.3  961.7  1012.0  1052.8  1078.3  1128.5  1195.5 
           
Percent of Actuarial Liability 
6  Active  Member  Contributions  14.96 14.54 14.24 13.79 13.58 13.37 13.15 
7  Retirees  &  Beneficiaries  44.85 45.28 46.24 47.66 49.26 50.09 50.58 
8  Active  Members  (Employer  Financed  Portion)  40.18 40.18 39.52 38.56 37.15 36.54 36.27 
Notes: 
 
1Estimates are based on a sample of retirement systems, weighted by membership to represent the entire population, as described 
in the text. 
 
232 systems did not report solvency test data.  Some systems combined the retiree health liability with the pension liability. 
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Table 4. 
A.  ABO liability per worker for various ages and years of service (as a percent of age 65 liability) 
 
    Years of service   
Age 2  7 12 17 22 27  32  37  42 
22  <0.01 … … … … …  …  …  … 
27  0.01  0.03 … … … …  …  …  … 
32  0.04  0.12  0.18 … … …  …  …  … 
37 0.13 0.37 0.55 0.70  …  …  …  …  … 
42 0.36 1.03 1.51 1.87 2.15  …  …  …  … 
47 1.00 2.72 3.88 4.71 5.33 5.82  …  …  … 
52  2.40  7.19  9.86 11.64 12.91 13.87  14.61 … … 
57  7.38 16.80 23.67 26.82 28.93 30.43  31.56  32.43 … 
62 26.60 48.19 55.08 58.52 60.58 61.96  62.95  63.68  64.26 
 
 
B.  Projected Unit Credit liability per worker for various ages and years of service (as a percent of age 65 liability) 
 
    Years of service   
Age 2  7 12 17 22 27  32  37  42 
22  0.01 … … … … …  …  …  … 
27  0.03  0.10 … … … …  …  …  … 
32  0.10  0.31  0.48 … … …  …  …  … 
37 0.25 0.79 1.19 1.50  …  …  …  …  … 
42 0.61 1.81 2.67 3.30 3.80  …  …  …  … 
47 1.43 4.06 5.80 7.04 7.97 8.70  …  …  … 
52  2.99  9.31 12.76 15.07 16.71 17.95  18.91 … … 
57  8.20 19.29 27.18 30.80 33.22 34.94  36.24  37.24 … 
62 27.15 50.40 57.60 61.20 63.36 64.80  65.82  66.60  67.20 
 
 
C.  Ratio: ABO to Projected Unit Credit liabilities 
 
    Years of service   
Age 2  7 12 17 22 27  32  37  42 
22  0.25 … … … … …  …  …  … 
27  0.32  0.30 … … … …  …  …  … 
32  0.40  0.38  0.38 … … …  …  …  … 
37 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.47  …  …  …  …  … 
42 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57  …  …  …  … 
47 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67  …  …  … 
52 0.80 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77  0.77  …  … 
57 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87  0.87  0.87  … 
62 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96  0.96  0.96  0.96 
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Table 5. 
A.  ABO normal cost per worker for various ages and years of service (as a percent of salary) 
 
    Years of service   
Age 2  7 12 17 22 27  32  37  42 
22  0.03 … … … … …  …  …  … 
27  0.12  0.15 … … … …  …  …  … 
32  0.32  0.41  0.47 … … …  …  …  … 
37 0.72 0.88 1.02 1.15  …  …  …  …  … 
42 1.42 1.70 1.94 2.18 2.42  …  …  …  … 
47 2.70 3.11 3.50 3.89 4.28 4.67  …  …  … 
52 4.22 5.61 6.22 6.82 7.43 8.03  8.64  …  … 
57  7.71  8.56 10.22 11.07 11.91 12.76  13.60  14.44 … 
62 12.77 14.60 15.64 16.68 17.72 18.76  19.81  20.85  21.89 
 
 
B.  Projected Unit Credit normal cost per worker for various ages and years of service (as a percent of salary) 
 
    Years of service   
Age 2  7 12 17 22 27  32  37  42 
22  0.12 … … … … …  …  …  … 
27  0.35  0.36 … … … …  …  …  … 
32  0.75  0.79  0.79 … … …  …  …  … 
37 1.37 1.42 1.42 1.42  …  …  …  …  … 
42 2.27 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33  …  …  …  … 
47 3.69 3.73 3.73 3.73 3.73 3.73  …  …  … 
52 5.07 6.01 6.01 6.01 6.01 6.01  6.01  …  … 
57 8.35 8.41 9.22 9.22 9.22 9.22  9.22  9.22  … 
62 12.75 13.53 13.53 13.53 13.53 13.53  13.53  13.53  13.53 
 
 
C.  Ratio: ABO to Projected Unit Credit normal costs 
 
    Years of service   
Age 2  7 12 17 22 27  32  37  42 
22  0.27 … … … … …  …  …  … 
27  0.34  0.42 … … … …  …  …  … 
32  0.43  0.51  0.60 … … …  …  …  … 
37 0.53 0.62 0.72 0.81  …  …  …  …  … 
42 0.63 0.73 0.83 0.93 1.04  …  …  …  … 
47 0.73 0.84 0.94 1.04 1.15 1.25  …  …  … 
52 0.83 0.93 1.03 1.14 1.24 1.34  1.44  …  … 
57 0.92 1.02 1.11 1.20 1.29 1.38  1.47  1.57  … 
62 1.00 1.08 1.16 1.23 1.31 1.39  1.46  1.54  1.62 
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Table 6. 
A.  Distribution of employment, 2000 (percent of total employment) 
 
    Years of service   
Age  0-4  5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29  30-34  35-39  40+ 
<25  2.92 ... ... ... ... ...  ...  ...  ... 
25-29  5.71  0.72 ... ... ... ...  ...  ...  ... 
30-34  6.17  2.48  0.73 ... ... ...  ...  ...  ... 
35-39  6.97 4.15 2.48 1.00  ...  ... ... ... ... 
40-44  7.23 5.05 3.77 2.96 1.15  ... ... ... ... 
45-49  5.81 4.81 4.01 3.76 2.39 0.56 ... ... ... 
50-54  3.55 3.31 3.13 2.55 1.69 0.82  0.15 ... ... 
55-59  1.70 1.71 1.36 1.14 0.64 0.25  0.09 0 ... 
60+  0.84 0.85 0.65 0.43 0.20 0.09  0.02  0.01 0 
 
 
B.  Distribution of employment, 2006 (percent of total employment) 
 
    Years of service   
Age  0-4  5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29  30-34  35-39  40+ 
<25  3.36 ... ... ... ... ...  ...  ...  ... 
25-29  6.20  0.87 ... ... ... ...  ...  ...  ... 
30-34  5.70  2.73  0.53 ... ... ...  ...  ...  ... 
35-39  5.74 3.41 1.55 0.49  ...  ... ... ... ... 
40-44  6.08 3.94 2.42 1.79 0.52  ... ... ... ... 
45-49  5.89 4.16 3.11 2.74 2.02 0.87 ... ... ... 
50-54  4.38 4.09 3.38 2.92 2.42 1.66  0.19 ... ... 
55-59  2.78 2.35 2.21 2.00 1.20 0.72  0.16  0.04 ... 
60+  1.44 1.34 0.95 0.74 0.49 0.27  0.10  0.04 0 
 
 
C.  Average age and years of service, by year 
 
   Average  Average  years 
 Year  Age  of  service 
 2000  43.0  8.3 
 2001  43.7  8.4 
 2002  43.7  8.4 
 2003  43.7  8.3 
 2004  44.0  8.4 
 2005  44.3  8.4 
 2006  44.4  8.5 
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Table 7. 
A.  Ratio of ABO to Entry Age (EA) and Projected Unit Credit (PUC) liabilities and normal costs 
(wages grow 1% per year plus salary scale) 
 
   Liabilities     Normal  Costs   
 Year  ABO/EA  ABO/PUC  ABO/EA  ABO/PUC 
  2000  0.496 0.773 1.003 0.978 
  2001  0.521 0.789 1.048 0.995 
  2002  0.535 0.797 1.082 1.006 
  2003  0.535 0.796 1.072 1.005 
  2004  0.557 0.810 1.128 1.021 
  2005  0.553 0.808 1.118 1.019 
  2006  0.563 0.813 1.145 1.026 
 
 
B.  Ratio of ABO to Entry Age (EA) and Projected Unit Credit (PUC) liabilities and normal costs 
(same assumptions as used for Panel A, except wages grow 2% per year plus salary scale) 
 
   Liabilities     Normal  Costs   
 Year  ABO/EA  ABO/PUC  ABO/EA  ABO/PUC 
  2000  0.455 0.689 0.966 0.947 
  2001  0.481 0.708 1.015 0.971 
  2002  0.495 0.718 1.053 0.988 
  2003  0.494 0.717 1.044 0.986 
  2004  0.518 0.735 1.104 1.010 
  2005  0.514 0.731 1.093 1.006 
  2006  0.523 0.738 1.122 1.017 
   44
Table 8.  Household wealth in, and income from, state and local government defined benefit pension plans: ABO approach 
with market discount rate
1 
  Flows are measured for years ending on December 31; stocks are measured as of December 31. 
  Billions of dollars (or as noted) 
           
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1  Household  income  168.1 195.3 202.7 218.5 229.6 233.6 251.8 
2    Employer's normal cost (net of administrative  
    expense)  55.5 63.4 74.0 76.5 79.3 82.5 85.6 
3    Imputed interest on actuarial liability
2  112.7 131.9 128.6 141.9 150.3 151.0 166.2 
4  Less: Benefits net of employee contributions  74.7  82.7  91.6 101.1 109.3 117.4 127.5 
5  Equals: Household saving in DB pension plans  93.4 112.6 111.1 117.3 120.3 116.2 124.3 
6  Actuarial liability of DB plans  2,019.0 2,270.3 2,620.1 2,821.6 3,054.4 3,283.5 3,406.3 
7  Plan assets (market value)
3  2,163.1 2,157.8 2,146.9 2,305.0 2,558.8 2,757.0 3,116.9 
8  Unfunded actuarial liability  -144.1 112.4 473.2 516.6 495.6 526.5 289.3 
9  Funded  ratio  (%)  107.14 95.05 81.94 81.69 83.77 83.97 91.51 
 
  Addenda:         
10  Unfunded actuarial liability, % of covered payroll -29.19  21.56 87.20 92.77 86.45 88.35 46.24 
11  Employer's  normal  cost  per  active  member  (dollars)  4,103 4,579 5,267 5,436 5,625 5,793 5,929 
12  Employer's normal cost, % of covered payroll  11.23 12.15 13.64 13.75 13.83 13.85 13.68 
13  Discount  rate  (%)  5.58 5.81 4.91 5.03 4.92 4.60 4.88 
Notes: 
 
1Estimates are based on a sample of retirement systems, weighted by membership to represent the entire population, as described 
in the text. 
 
2Using discount rate as given on line 13. 
 
3Total cash and investment holdings.   45
Table 9.  Household wealth in, and income from, state and local government defined benefit pension plans: ABO approach 
with 6% discount rate
1 
  Flows are measured for years ending on December 31; stocks are measured as of December 31. 
  Billions of dollars (or as noted) 
           
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1  Household  income  175.3 193.3 207.1 219.4 232.4 246.2 266.0 
2    Employer's normal cost (net of administrative  
    expense)  55.0 60.8 64.2 65.9 67.6 69.8 76.4 
3    Imputed interest on actuarial liability
2  120.3 132.5 142.8 153.5 164.8 176.4 189.6 
4  Less: Benefits net of employee contributions  74.7  82.7  91.6 101.1 109.3 117.4 127.5 
5  Equals: Household saving in DB pension plans  100.6 110.6 115.4 118.3 123.1 128.8 138.5 
6  Actuarial liability of DB plans  2,005.1 2,207.7 2,380.8 2,558.1 2,747.2 2,939.3 3,159.7 
7  Plan assets (market value)
3  2,163.1 2,157.8 2,146.9 2,305.0 2,558.8 2,757.0 3,116.9 
8  Unfunded actuarial liability  -158.0  49.9 233.9 253.0 188.4 182.3  42.7 
9  Funded  ratio  (%)  107.88 97.74 90.18 90.11 93.14 93.80 98.65 
 
  Addenda:         
10  Unfunded actuarial liability, % of covered payroll -32.01  9.57 43.10 45.44 32.87 30.59 6.83 
11  Employer's  normal  cost  per  active  member  (dollars)  4,068 4,395 4,569 4,683 4,792 4,902 5,295 
12  Employer's normal cost, %  of covered payroll  11.14 11.66 11.84 11.84 11.78 11.72 12.22 
13  Discount  rate  (%)  6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
Notes: 
 
1Estimates are based on a sample of retirement systems, weighted by membership to represent the entire population, as described 
in the text. 
 
2Using discount rate as given on line 13. 
 
3Total cash and investment holdings. 
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Table 10.  Cost of living adjustment (COLA) provisions in state and local government pension plans, 2006 
 
  Number 
   of 
  Cost of Living Adjustment Provision  Systems 
  No automatic COLA provisions; ad hoc  
    adjustment occasionally granted  31 
 Automatic  COLA  provisions  93 
    Independent of inflation rate  34 
    Dependent on inflation rate  59 
      COLA capped at 2%  5 
      COLA capped at 2.5%  6 
      COLA capped at 3%  25 
      COLA capped at 3.5%  1 
      COLA capped at 4%  4 
      COLA capped at 5%  8 
      COLA capped at 6%  4 
      COLA capped at 9%  2 
    No  cap  4 
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Table 11.  Employer normal costs as a percent of covered payroll, by state [6% discount rate] 
For the year ending on December 31 
         
State  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Alabama  7.8 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.9 7.8 8.7 
Alaska  7.0 7.1 7.1 6.6 6.8 6.4 5.9 
Arizona  14.0 14.5 14.6 14.5 15.3 16.3 16.7 
Arkansas  13.6 14.0 13.8 14.0 13.1 12.0 12.2 
California  13.7 14.9 15.4 15.7 16.2 16.6 17.6 
Colorado  10.9 12.5 13.0 13.3 13.6 10.6 10.2 
Connecticut  5.7 5.8 4.9 4.0 3.9 4.7 5.8 
Delaware  10.5 11.0 11.1 11.4 11.6 11.4 11.6 
D.C.  24.3 25.3 25.8 26.0 26.9 26.9 27.7 
Florida  15.1 15.6 15.8 15.6 15.4 15.6 16.4 
Georgia  12.5 12.9 13.0 13.1 12.0 10.9 11.3 
Hawaii  8.4 7.8 8.0 8.3 8.4 8.1 8.8 
Idaho  11.8 11.3 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.8 11.8 
Illinois  10.7 10.4 10.6 10.6 11.5 12.0 13.0 
Indiana  7.8 8.2 7.8 7.5 7.7 8.3 8.8 
Iowa  6.7 7.0 7.1 7.4 7.6 7.6 8.4 
Kansas  4.4 4.6 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.8 5.8 
Kentucky  9.6 10.1 10.0  9.9 10.0  8.9  8.1 
Louisiana  9.3 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.7 9.7  10.1 
Maine  8.4 8.7 8.8 9.0 9.2 9.2 9.7 
Maryland  10.6 10.9 11.0 11.3 11.6 11.7 11.7 
Massachusetts  4.5 4.2 4.7 4.4 4.7 4.9 5.1 
Michigan  9.8 10.1 10.4 10.5 10.7 10.0 10.4 
Minnesota  6.9 7.1 7.2 7.0 6.5 6.5 6.6 
Mississippi  5.4 5.7 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.2 7.0 
Missouri  13.3 13.4 13.8 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.6 
Montana  5.6 6.0 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.9 
Nebraska  6.2 6.5 6.0 6.2 5.8 5.2 5.9 
Nevada  23.1 23.9 24.2 24.7 25.2 25.4 26.7 
New  Hampshire  7.1 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.8 7.8 8.2 
New  Jersey  10.3 10.5 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.7 10.6 
New  Mexico  8.5  9.2  9.7 10.3 10.9 11.3 12.2 
New  York  16.9 17.3 16.8 17.1 17.1 17.4 18.0 
North  Carolina  7.0 7.3 7.5 7.5 7.8 7.8 7.9 
North  Dakota  4.9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.7 6.3 6.5 
Ohio  7.6 7.9 7.8 7.7 8.0 7.9 7.8 
Oklahoma  6.9 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.5 7.6 8.1 
Oregon  12.9 17.4 18.1 17.9  6.8  5.1  6.2 
Pennsylvania  10.8 12.0 12.3 12.5 12.3 11.8 12.2 
Rhode  Island  4.2 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.6 4.7 5.1 
South  Carolina  5.9 6.1 6.0 5.6 5.6 5.9 6.1 
South  Dakota  5.7 5.9 6.0 6.3 6.5 6.5 6.9 
Tennessee  11.8 12.3 12.4 12.7 12.9 13.1 13.8 
Texas  8.5 9.1 9.2 8.7 8.1 7.2 7.4 
Utah  15.6 16.3 17.3 17.4 18.5 18.4 19.4 
Vermont  8.0 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.6 8.7 9.4 
Virginia  12.9 13.4 13.6 14.3 13.7 12.8 13.5 
Washington  15.0 14.4 15.0 13.2 11.3 11.1 11.2 
West  Virginia  5.1 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.4 
Wisconsin  9.6 10.7 10.8 10.7 11.0 11.0 11.3 
Wyoming  7.3 7.7 7.9 7.8 8.3 8.2 8.4 
         
All  states  plus  D.C.  11.1 11.7 11.8 11.8 11.8 11.7 12.2 
Note: Estimates are based on a sample of retirement systems, weighted by membership to represent the entire population, as described 
in the text. 
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Table 12.  Effect of actuarial accounting on personal income and saving and select components: ABO approach with 6% 
discount rate
1 
Billions of dollars (or as noted) 
           
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Current cash estimates 
1  Personal  income  (2.1,  1)  8,429.7 8,724.1 8,881.9 9,163.6 9,727.2  10,269.8  10,993.9 
2    Compensation, state & local  
    government  (6.2D,  92)  716.9 761.9 809.0 856.5 893.8 936.9 979.5 
3      Employer contributions to pension funds, 
      state  &  local  govt  (6.11D,30)  39.6 38.8 41.8 56.1 55.4 61.9 65.3 
4        As  a  percent  of  compensation  5.5 5.1 5.2 6.5 6.2 6.6 6.7 
5    Property income of state & local DB pension 
  f u n d s
2  85.1 70.6 69.6 77.5 82.1 87.4 95.5 
6  Personal  saving  (2.1,  33)  168.5 132.3 184.7 174.9 181.7  32.5  70.7 
7        As  a  percent  of  personal  income  2.0 1.5 2.1 1.9 1.9 0.3 0.6 
 
Using ABO approach with 6% discount rate 
8  Personal  income  8,480.3 8,808.0 8,977.6 9,249.5 9,822.1  10,366.8  11,099.1 
9    Compensation,  state  &  local  government  732.3 783.9 831.4 866.4 905.9 944.9 990.7 
10      Employer's normal cost, state &  
      local  DB  plans  55.0 60.8 64.2 65.9 67.6 69.8 76.4 
11        As  a  percent  of  compensation  7.5 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.7 
12    Imputed interest on actuarial liability of  
    state  &  local  DB  plans  120.3 132.5 142.8 153.5 164.8 176.4 189.6 
13  Personal  saving  219.1 216.2 280.4 260.8 276.6 129.5 175.9 
14        As  a  percent  of  personal  income  2.6 2.5 3.1 2.8 2.8 1.2 1.6 
 
Difference 
15  Personal  income  50.6 83.9 95.7 85.9 94.9 97.0  105.2 
16    Compensation, state & local government  15.4  22.0  22.5  9.9  12.1  8.0  11.1 
17      Employer contributions to pension funds,  
      state & local govt  15.4  22.0  22.5  9.9  12.1  8.0  11.1 
18    Property income of state & local DB pension  
    funds    35.2 61.9 73.2 76.0 82.7 89.0 94.1 
19  Personal  saving  50.6 83.9 95.7 85.9 94.9 97.0  105.2 
 
Percent difference 
20  Personal  income  0.60 0.96 1.08 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.96 
21    Compensation,  state  &  local  government  2.14 2.89 2.78 1.15 1.36 0.85 1.13 
22      Employer contributions to pension funds,  
      state  &  local  govt  38.76 56.83 53.75 17.59 21.86 12.92 17.00 
23    Property income of state & local DB pension  
  Funds  41.38  87.62 105.13  98.17 100.77 101.84  98.55 
24  Personal  saving  30.01 63.42 51.80 49.11 52.20  298.38  148.80 
Notes:  
 
1NIPA Table and line numbers are in parentheses. 
 
2Property income is dividends, interest, and rent.  This is an unpublished estimate. 
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Table 13.  Effect of actuarial accounting for pensions on personal income by state: ABO approach with 6% discount rate 
For the year ending on December 31 
Percent of personal income 
         
State  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Alabama  0.4 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 
Alaska  1.1 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.0 0.5 
Arizona  1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 
Arkansas  0.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.3 
California  0.9 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 
Colorado  0.6 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.2 
Connecticut  0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 
Delaware  0.4 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
D.C.  0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Florida  0.4 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Georgia  0.5 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.8 
Hawaii  1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6 
Idaho  0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Illinois  0.9 1.2 1.4  -0.2 0.9 1.8 1.9 
Indiana  -0.2 0.0 0.1  -0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Iowa  0.3 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Kansas  0.3 0.5 0.6  -0.1 0.4 0.6 0.6 
Kentucky  0.5 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 
Louisiana  0.8 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 
Maine  0.6 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 
Maryland  0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Massachusetts  0.4 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.0 
Michigan  0.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.8 
Minnesota  -0.9 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Mississippi  0.4 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
Missouri  1.0 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 
Montana  -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Nebraska  -0.4  -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Nevada  0.1 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 
New  Hampshire  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
New  Jersey  1.8 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 
New  Mexico  0.7 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 
New  York  1.6 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.3 
North  Carolina  -0.6 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 
North  Dakota  0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Ohio  0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Oklahoma  0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 
Oregon  -0.3  0.0 -1.3 -1.7 -1.0  0.3  0.3 
Pennsylvania  0.8 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 
Rhode  Island  0.4 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 
South  Carolina  -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
South  Dakota  0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Tennessee  0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 
Texas  0.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Utah  0.6 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.2 
Vermont  0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 
Virginia  0.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.8 
Washington  1.4 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 
West  Virginia  -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 
Wisconsin  0.8 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.7 1.5 1.4 
Wyoming  0.1 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.5 
         
All  states  plus  D.C.  0.6 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 
 
 